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Abstract— Cybersecurity education and training activities are 
essential to empower end users to take informed decisions and 
address cyber threats. An ongoing problem that still troubles the 
cybersecurity community is the selection of weak passwords. 
Users keep using weak passwords, cultivating the risk of 
compromisation. Users often choose passwords that appear to be 
strong. This creates a false sense of security as users have the 
belief that their passwords cannot be guessed. Unfortunately, 
given that attackers are aware of the users’ habits, they often 
recover users’ passwords. Therefore, it is imperative to educate 
people about the bad password construction strategies and 
empower them to select stronger passwords. Educational 
activities should be enhanced by integrating practical aspects that 
will assist the users to realize the problem. This work identifies 
and combines a range of bad password construction strategies 
and designs a relevant tool to practically demonstrate the 
strategies to the users. 
Keywords – bad password construction strategies, end user 
situational awareness, cybersecurity education, password cracking, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The global digital society that is formulated by the 
interconnection of ICT systems, supporting the Internet of 
Things (IoT) paradigm [1], has created new opportunities but 
also increased cyber threats. Critical services in areas such as 
healthcare, transport and energy, operate through cyberspace 
and reach a wide spread audience. Therefore, cyberspace has 
become a key enabler and a critical asset for the growth of 
modern digital societies, thus it is imperative to ensure its 
protection. 
Unfortunately, as indicated by latest reports [2], cyber 
threats keep rising, although a broad range of operational and 
technical countermeasures are utilized. The human factor plays 
a significant role in cybersecurity, especially with regards to 
successfully addressing cyber threats and minimizing their 
impact on critical assets. Often, the human factor is considered 
the weakest link in cybersecurity as it hinders the effectiveness 
of the security solutions due to the insecure decisions and 
relevant actions that are taken [3]. Therefore, it is crucial to 
empower end-users and enhance their knowledge, so they can 
take responsible decisions when it comes to various security 
aspects. 
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A key security aspect that users need to be educated about 
is user authentication, specifically the selection of strong 
passwords [4]. Although a variety of measures (e.g. awareness 
activities, password-strength checkers, password-composition 
policies, etc.) are taken to prevent users from selecting weak 
passwords, statistics [2] reveal that the problem remains. 
Selection of weak passwords can happen due to various 
reasons [3] such as ignorance on the subject; choosing 
convenience over following good security practices; due to a 
false sense of security [5], etc. The latter, concerns a factor that 
is challenging to address. A false sense of security can occur 
when end users are adhering to password policies but in an 
insecure way. Often, in their attempt to create a memorable 
password, they employ a variety of password construction 
strategies, with the belief that hackers will not be able to 
predict their password. This misconception can impact the 
perception of the end users with regards to the protection level 
that is actually achieved. Even if their password adheres to the 
respective password policy, it can still lead to a weak 
password. Therefore, it is vital to enhance the situational 
awareness of end users to eliminate, or at least, minimize the 
potential of a false sense of security. Given that weak 
passwords are one of the main vulnerabilities that attackers 
exploit to gain unauthorised access, it is imperative to keep 
educating people on the subject and enhancing their 
knowledge, so they can select stronger passwords. This can be 
achieved by designing educational tools [6] that can practically 
demonstrate to the end users the password construction 
strategies that are known to the cybersecurity community, 
including both defenders and attackers. Such tools can assist 
end users to realize what kind of potential passwords can be 
generated by specific construction strategies and assist them 
taking more informed decisions with regards to the strategy 
they utilize. Existing tools are not designed with the objective 
of demonstrating the aforementioned aspects. 
The objective of this research work is to: a) investigate and 
identify bad password construction strategies that should be 
taken into consideration when designing educational / 
awareness activities and tools, and b) design a tool that can 
complement training and awareness efforts and demonstrate to 
the end users the specified bad practices and the relevant 
passwords that can be generated, thus the need to be aware of 
their existence so they can be avoided. Section II discusses 
related work. Section III specifies known password 
construction practices. Section IV presents the design of a 
demonstration tool and discusses how the tool can be utilized 
to complement a training curriculum. Section V constitutes 
conclusion. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The problem of weak passwords is not new to the research 
community. The last few decades, the research community is 
actively investigating the issue, analyzing users’ habits and 
making valuable observations with regards to the utilized 
password selection strategies. Morris and Thompson [7] 
performed one of the very early studies, demonstrating that a 
significant number of users were choosing as passwords, words 
found in dictionaries. In later studies [8] [9], it was observed 
that passwords that contained personal information of a user 
(such as name, surname, or telephone number) could be easily 
recovered. Furthermore, a study delivered by Brown et al. [10] 
observed that the most widely used personal information in 
passwords are those related to the user (e.g. date of birth), 
followed by information related to the user’s family, lovers and 
friends. The authors also found that the most frequently used 
information was names and dates. A similar conclusion was 
made in [11]. The author has identified that users commonly 
include information related to their life, such as numbers (e.g. 
dates), words (e.g. pets), names (e.g. of friends, family) or 
locations (e.g. cities). Recently, Li, Wang, and Sun [12], 
analyzed an exposed collection of passwords and confirmed 
that users still include personal information in their passwords.  
Another interesting observation was made in [13]. The 
authors identified that 43% of people are using the same 
password or slightly modified across different accounts. They 
also developed an algorithm to predict the transformation rules 
that the users applied on their passwords, and managed to 
recover 30% of the slightly modified passwords. This 
demonstrates the risk of compromising different user’s 
accounts, when one of the transformed passwords has been 
compromised. Often, users miscalculate the risks involved, 
therefore, they take actions that lead to vulnerabilities, e.g. 
weak passwords.  
Another approach was taken in [14], where the authors 
asked participants to compose passwords, taking into 
consideration specific composition rules. The objective was to 
observe if the constructed passwords met the appropriate 
construction rules and if they were strong enough. The authors 
managed to discover 20% of the passwords, using a keyboard 
pattern that was utilized by the users. Chou et al. [15] also 
demonstrated that passwords adhering to commonly used 
keyboard patterns of adjacent and parallel keys, called AP 
patterns, can be recovered. On a later study [16], the authors 
discovered that users used semantic patterns in their passwords 
which could have a major impact on security. Semantics are 
sequences of words that have a meaning. For example, they 
have found that many passwords contained concepts relating to 
love, animals, food and money, and they have presented 
approaches for recovering such passwords.  
Observations and reported cyber security incidents, indicate 
that end users are keep using bad password selection strategies.  
Creating a password with the above construction techniques, 
increases the risk of compromisation, since these techniques 
are known to both defenders and attackers. To address the 
problem, a variety of solutions have been proposed to assist 
people selecting stronger passwords. 
One such solution is the design of password meters, e.g. 
[17] [18], that calculate how strong a password might be by 
calculating the number of predictions an attacker requires, on 
average, to recover the password. The strength of the password 
depends on its architecture; the longer and more complex the 
password is, the more difficult it is to be cracked. Although the 
usage of password meters is promising to address the problem 
of weak passwords, further work needs to be done to enhance 
their functionality. Castelluccia et al. [19] stated that password 
meters are providing insufficient feedback to the users, and that 
meters did not influence the users to select secure passwords 
[20]. Carnavalet’s et al. [21] also indicated that password 
meters have several weaknesses such as lack of consistency, 
providing wrong feedback and sometimes misleading strength 
outcomes. In such cases, password strength meters are not 
effective, and they don’t assist users to learn from their 
mistakes. As a result, users will continue to choose weak 
passwords. 
 Another solution to empower the selection of strong 
passwords is through password composition policies that are 
enforced by computer systems during password construction. A 
password composition policy can be defined as a list of rules, 
with the purpose of forcing or advising users to construct 
secure passwords. Some examples of password policies 
include: a) Uppercase and lowercase letters, b) One or more 
numbers, c) Special characters (e.g. !, @, #), d) Password must 
have length 8 or more, and e) Prohibit the usage of company 
name or an abbreviation. Password composition policies are a 
necessity to drive users choosing strong passwords. 
Nevertheless, it appears that common password policies 
continue to be exposed to on-line attacks [22] and that people 
fail to remember passwords created with strict password 
policies [23] [24]. Moreover, as observed in [25], users often 
employ circumvention strategies to create a password that 
adheres to the password policy but is still easy to remember. 
Unfortunately, such circumvention strategies lead to highly 
predictable passwords. This indicates the need to balance 
security and usability to make password policies more 
effective.  
The fact that user selection strategies are known, led to the 
design of a variety of user profiling tools, e.g. [26] [27] [28], 
that can generate potential passwords that could be utilized by 
a specific user. However, these tools are focusing on 
optimizing the password cracking process, rather that educating 
users about the known bad password selection strategies. More 
specific tools are needed [6] to empower end users and 
minimize the risk of compromisation due to the selection of 
weak passwords. 
III. COMMON PASSWORD CONSTRUCTION STRATEGIES 
The objective of this research work is to identify bad 
password construction strategies that should be taken into 
consideration when designing educational / awareness 
activities and tools. By promoting the integration of these 
strategies into educational activities, the aim is to enhance 
users’ awareness and assist them in realizing how a potential 
strategy can lead to weak passwords. Therefore, it can promote 
better decisions and the construction of stronger passwords. 
The following categories of password construction 
strategies have been identified, based on the investigations 
performed in the literature, from exposed password lists, 
different password cracking tools and online reports about most 
utilized passwords: 
a) User-related information. This category includes 
information about a person, his/her family and interests. 
b) Keyboard combinations. Users often use keyboard 
patterns from a specific device, e.g. smartphone, laptop, etc. 
c) Placement strategy. This category includes strategies that 
append one or more numbers / letters / symbols at the front, 
end or within a word. 
d) Word processing. Password construction strategies may 
specify word processing rules such as reversing, rotating or 
doubling a word, etc.  
e) Substitution. Another typical strategy is to substitute one 
or more letters in a word with symbols and/or numbers. 
f) Capitalization. This category includes capitalizing one or 
more letters at any given place in a word. 
g) Append dates. Users often append dates to a word such 
as a partial date, a season, a year, etc. 
h) Combination. More advanced strategies can be generated 
by combining strategies from the aforementioned categories. 
IV. PASSWORD GENERATOR TOOL BASED ON USER PROFILING 
This section presents a tool that has been designed taking 
into consideration the password construction strategies 
specified in section III. The tool demonstrates what kind of 
passwords can be constructed by utilizing one or more 
strategies and assists the end-users to identify the password 
construction strategies that can generate weak passwords. The 
objective is to integrate the tool into educational / awareness 
activities and assist efforts that target to empower the users to 
select stronger passwords.  
The tool design is inspired by the conceptual architecture in 
[6] and focuses on the processing of personal information to 
generate candidate passwords. As explained in section II, one 
of the frequently utilized password construction strategies is 
using personal information. In order to increase the 
effectiveness of their passwords, end users process their 
password further, by applying other strategies. For example, a 
user selects his spouse name e.g. Jessica. He decides to add 
part of his birthday date, apply substitution and also add a 
symbol, resulting to Je$sic@1203!. The user created a 
password that at a first glance may be considered as complex 
enough, thus the user has the belief that it is not easily 
guessable. These situations create a false sense of security. 
Unfortunately, the approach taken created a predictable 
password that can easily lead to a security breach and exposure 
of sensitive data. The proposed tool targets to highlight these 
situations and educate the users accordingly. 
The following sections present the operation and main 
features of the proposed tool. The tool provides a sequence of 
screens to the user, to provide appropriate input and to select 
among the listed password construction strategies. At the end, 
the generated list of passwords is presented to the user. 
A. Operation 
The operation of the tool focuses on four key features: 
1) Profiling the user 
User profiling includes identifying information with regards 
to the individual, his/her family and interests. As indicated in 
Fig. 1, there are predefined fields and the user is expected to 
enter the relevant information. Moreover, the tool supports 
extendibility by allowing the user to enter a new field, not 
included in the tool. A new field can be entered by selecting the 
button “Add key”. 
 
Fig. 1. User profiling password construction strategy 
2) Presenting known password construction strategies 
that can lead to weak passwords 
The tool presents a screen to the user that lists a set of 
categories. The categories list specific password construction 
strategies. Overall, the tool implements 318 password 
construction strategies. By selecting a category from the left 
side of the screen (Fig. 2), the listed strategies are presented to 
the user. The user can select strategies from the following list: 
- All. This category contains all the password 
construction strategies implemented by the tool. 
- Top 10 / Top 20. This category contains the 10 or 20 
most widely used password construction strategies. For 
example, a recent study [12] revealed that most of users include 
dates at the end of their passwords. So potential passwords can 
be generated by considering the user’s name + year of birth.  
- Numbers. This category includes password 
construction strategies which are related with numbers. For 
example, inserting numbers at the end, at the front or inside a 
string. An example of a listed strategy includes appending 3 
numbers at the end of a string. Potential passwords could be 
generated by the children name + any three combinations of 
numbers, e.g. alice123, alice111, alice000, etc. 
- Symbols. This category includes password 
construction strategies which are related with symbols. For 
example, inserting special characters at the end, at the front or 
inside a string. One of the listed strategies include adding one 
symbol at any position in a string, e.g. !alice, a!lice, al!ice, 
ali!ce, *alice, etc.  
- Letters. This category includes password construction 
strategies which are related with letters, both uppercase and 
lowercase. For example, append one uppercase letter at the end 
of a string, e.g. aliceR. 
- Dates. A variety of studies revealed that users are 
adding dates in their passwords. Partial or full dates can be 
inserted at any given position in a string e.g. alice2018. 
- Key combinations. This category contains password 
construction strategies based on the patterns presented in [14]. 
- Hashcat rules. Hashcat [29] is a well know password 
cracking tool. The password construction strategies of Hashcat 
are included to demonstrate how powerful existing password 
cracking tools are, especially if the hacker is aware of user 
information. 
- Advanced.  This category combines strategies from 
previous listed categories. For example, it creates potential 
passwords by inserting one symbol at the start of a string and 
three numbers at the end, e.g. !alice876, !alice123, etc. 
3) Processing the user-specified information using 
selected strategies 
The user selects specific strategies that represent what 
he/she had in mind using to generate a password. For example, 
as Fig. 2 indicates, the user considered a key combination. So, 
a potential password could be Jessicaaws.  
4) Generating potential passwords up to a given length 
The last step is to choose a given length and generate 
potential passwords. At the end, the user can go over the list of 
generated passwords (Fig. 3) and search if specific password 
instances he/she was considering, are included in the list.  
B. Demonstration and evaluation 
To demonstrate the usage of the tool and to evaluate it, an 
appropriate awareness activity was designed. The purpose of 
the activity was to assist end users to evaluate if currently 
selected password construction strategies and relevant 
passwords are weak. The activity involved 3 main tasks: 
a) The activity involved 30 participants (age: 23 – 55) that 
initially, they were asked to provide a potential password they 
would consider using. They have been advised not to reveal 
passwords that they were currently using. 
b) Once the password collection was completed, passwords 
were analyzed. Results are presented in Table 1, indicating 
how many of the passwords included a specific type of 
information. Overall, it can be observed that most of the 
passwords include personal information, confirming once more 
users’ tendency towards this strategy. Only a small percentage 
(10%) listed random passwords. The identified trends have 
been discussed with participants, so they were aware of the 
patterns utilized. For example, results indicate that there was a 
high tendency (40%) towards considering dates e.g. full date, 
year, etc. 
 
Fig. 2. Key combination password construction strategy 
 
Fig. 3. Generated password list 
TABLE I.  EVALUATION RESULTS 
 Included 
information 
Number of 
passwords 
Percentage  
1 Date 12 40% 
2 Name 7 23.33% 
3 Sequence 4 13.33% 
1 Random 3 10% 
5 Surname 2 6.66% 
6 Fictional characters 2 6.66% 
7 Phone number 2  6.66% 
8 Football team 1 3.33% 
9 Phrase 1 3.33% 
10 Places 1 3.33% 
 
c) An evaluation of the tool was performed, considering 
user information and the password construction strategies that 
were relevant to the analysis performed in the previous task. 
The tool was able to identify about 47% of the passwords, 
demonstrating to the users that the selected strategies led to 
predictable passwords. This helped users enhance their 
perception of how strong their passwords are, considering 
specific construction strategies. At the end of the activity, 80% 
of the users reported that they will change the passwords they 
are currently using as they have realized that the construction 
strategy they considered led to the creation of weak passwords.   
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Passwords remain one of the main authentication 
techniques that users utilize to gain access to systems and 
information. Yet, weak passwords still trouble the 
cybersecurity community as they are among the key 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers to 
compromise a system and access critical information. The 
human factor plays a significant role in the protection of 
systems. The decisions taken by end users can positively or 
negatively impact the protection level that can be achieved. 
Therefore, it is imperative to continue educational and training 
efforts and empowering end users to take informed decisions. 
With regards to the construction of passwords, end users have 
to realize what password construction strategies might lead to 
weak passwords, even though at a first glance some of the 
chosen passwords may seem complex enough. Educational 
activities need to integrate practical activities and tools to 
demonstrate the usage of known strategies and potential 
passwords that can be generated, and which are easily 
guessable. By providing practical examples to the end users, 
we can help them realize the issue and promote the 
construction of stronger passwords. As a future work, authors 
are planning to enhance the functionality of the tool and create 
new cybersecurity educational activities.  
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